most "mass society" assumptions. Instead, these studies have offered explanations that point to the more "normal" process of adoption of political values, that of "differential socialization" (Portes, 1971; Petras and Zeitlin, 1968). According to the "differential socialization" theory the choice of some individuals to embrace some form of political radicalism is "a function of differential exposure" to that ideology and "the political preferences of models encountered during the process of socialization" (Portes, 1971:830).

Only recently has similar attention and debate been focused on militant Islamic movements in the Middle East. The sociological understanding of such movements has proven "difficult," note Sabagh and Ghazalla (1986: 389), "partly because Islamic groups have emerged recently and are still evolving, and partly because there is a 'scarcity of firsthand information based on observations, intensive interviews, or surveys." Data from the Afghan "Islamist" groups provides a basis for comparison of this movement to similar movements in the region, and can serve as grounds for further generalizations.

<u>Review of Literature</u>

A) <u>First Generation of Extremists</u>: The above-mentioned limitations have led to a lack of theoretical clarity in the available literature on Islamic militancy. For example, Ansari (1984) focusing on an Egyptian militant Islamic group uses historical data to point to the importance of 'kinship

netwroks' in the process of recruitment. Thus he appears inconsistent and contradictory when he concludes that religious extremism in Egypt has been "the product of conditions of alienation...as a consequence of the breakdown of traditional solidarities and communal ties under the impact of urbanization or rural migration into cities." As proof Ansari points to his finding that the militants are from those rural areas or small towns that have experienced much urbanization in recent years. But, the causal relationaship between urbanization and psychological "unsettlement", as well as the consequent effects of the latter on Islamic militancy remain assumed and undocumented.

In an earlier study of Islamic militancy in Egypt, Ibrahim (1980) had reached a different conclusion. Ibrahim gathered primary data based on interviews with leaders of two related in their organizational origins and kinship networks to those studied later by Ansari. Ibrahim contends that the sociological characteristics of the Egyptian Islamic militants "poses theoretical prolblems, since it is sometimes assumed in social sciences that members of "radical movements" must be alienated, marginal, anomic, or must posses some other abnormal characteristic." The sociological characteristics identified by Ibrahim are not different rom those referred to by Ansari. Both studies describe the typical militant as young (early twenties), of rural or saml l-town background, from the middle or lower-middle class, and highly educated and thus upwardly

moblile (Ibrahim, 1980:440; Ansari: 1984:133-4). Contrary to "disorientation," Ibrahim asserts, these characteristics show an "acheivement orientation," "high levels of motivation," combined with "political awareness." Moreover, in differentiating between letist and Islamic militant movements in Egypt Ibrahim points towards differential socialization theory when he states that as a result of "the deep-rootedness of Islam [especially in rural areas]..., for any militant Islamic movement, nearly half its task of recruiting members is already done by socialization and cultural sanctions since childhood. The other half of their task is merely to politicize their consciousness and to discipline their recruits organizationally." (1980:448)

B) Second Generation Extremists:

i) Nonstate Efforts: The studies cited above focus on militants who have been at the forefronts of their respective movements. They have constituded the first generation of leaders and organized members of a movement, even though they may have been preceeded by their movements' ideological founders. As first generation militants, the radical political socialization practices the Egyptian Islamists experienced have been primarily nonformal or informal in nature such as with in families (Ibrahim, 1980). However, in order to mobilize organizationally these movements must attempt to attract and politicize a mass of followers through a more formal and systematic process. Thus, one finds in the Egyptian case also a great reliance

on more formal channels of socialization such as sermons delivered in mosques controlled by the militants or their sympathizers (Ansari, 1984:129). In both formal and nonformal cases, however, these efforts fall outside the sphere of state control.

Similarly, according to Mottahedeh (1985[?]: pp) in the case of Iran, formal channels of political socialization were also utilized by the clergy to politicize and mobilize mass support prior to the onset of the revolution. These took the form of the thousands of religious study groups that sprang up in Tehran and other cities.

ii) <u>State Efforts</u>: Not surprisingly, subsequent to the seizure of power by any radical movement, the movement's focus main arena of political socialization shifts to an even more systematic and formal sphere, that of the state controlled school system (Wallace, 1979). However, the nature of such socialization differs from the pre-revolutionary period in that it is no longer geared towards delegitimizing the old regime. Rather, as in the case of Iran, it mainly focuses on consolidating the newly established regime (Mehran, forthcoming) .

Hinnebaush's (1980) study of the Syrian Ba'th party's Revolutionary Youth Federation (RYF) also points to the adoption of more formal and systematic socialization processes in political socialization and mobilization in post-revolutionary societies. The RYF, Hinnebaush notes, serves as the party's "specialized recruitment-socialization

infrastructure." Compared to a pre-revolutionary setting,however, RYF members are found to be "politically loyal to the regime and to Ba'thist ideas, but not necessarily intense ideologues." Hinnebaush attributes this to the fact that the regime has consolidated itself and is no longer in need of such ideologues (1980:169-70).

Hypotheses:

Following Portes (1971), Zeitlin (1968), and Ibrahim (1980), I have hypothesized that differential political socialization through party controlled schools significantly affects the direction (traditional vs. militant Islamic) and extent of political mobilization of Afghan refugee youth attending these schools. Originally, it was hypothesized that for both the Islamist revolutionaries and the traditionalists the schools would function as important political socialization agents and political mobilization channels. Subsequent observation has led to an important modification. It is now hypothesized that while both groups make attempts at political socialization through education, only the Islamist revolutionary groups utilize their schools for political mobilization ends. This is explained partly by the greater level of organizational development in these organiztions as compared to the traditionalist ones. As argued below, mobilization, in contrast to mere socialization, requires a minimum level of organizational development. The general lack of organization in traditionalist parties reflects directly on the level of

organization in their schools and thus on the low level of political mobilization that is carried out in them.

Additionally, it is argued that the traditionalists' political ideology is not radically different from that which is informally learned by most Afghans at home. The Islamist revolutionaries' ideology, however, represents a new worldview to the majority of the Afghan population (Shahrani, 1984:48), even if as effective "Mujahids" against the Soviets, they command the sympathy and alligence of major sectors of the population. Thus the political socialization and mobilization strategy in "traditionalist" schools may merely serve to reenforce political values prevalent at the home. On the other hand the Islamist revolutionaries need an alternative political socialization channel such as the school. Thus the effects of the students' family backgrounds are expected to be insignificant in determining an Islamic militant orientation, but significant in determining a traditionalist orientation in their political beliefs and mobilization, as in the latter case they are not mediated by schooling (See figure #1).

Additionally, the level of disorientation, as a by-product of war and migration, is expected to be constant for students attending Islamist revolutionary and traditionalist schools. Within the student population as a whole, however, this factor may lead to greater propensity towards ideological persuation, organizational

participation, and political mobilization. But the direction and strength of this relationship is not expected to be biased towards favoring political extremism and is equally expected to lead to relatively increased levels of ideological commitment to traditionalist principles in traditionalist schools. [Must include latter argument in figure 1]

It is further argued that while for the students the choice of traditionalist or Islamist revolutionary school depends on the political affiliation of the family, the latter depends not so much on ideological preferences of the family as it does on kinship, ethnic, tribal, and regional networks (Roy, 1985: [?]). Thus while the party schools are expected to have student populations from different ethnic mixes, the level of political activity and the ideological direction of the students' fathers in both schools are expected to be similar and not to differ significantly. (See figure #2.)

Mibilization Processes and Indices

A theoretical framework focusing on political processes in the immediate pre-revolutionary period that offers a workable definition of political mobilization is that of "resource mobilization" as outlined by Charles Tilly (1978; +?). Tilly has defined mobilization as the "acquisition of collective control over resources, rather than the simple accretion of resources." As he explains: "A group that grows in size has more manpower in it ...[but]

that does not mean the absolute or proportionate manpower committed to collective ends increases" (1978:78). Rather it is through organizationally channeling these resources towards collective ends that a group is enabled to influence other groups and contend for power. Accordingly, since this study hypothesizes that the Islamist revolutionary parties utilize educational institutions as recruiting channels for their organizations, and as training grounds for the war effort, education in this context can be viewed as a "political mobilization" tool [resource].

Paul Berman's (1974) case study of institution-building among the Viet Cong provides a unique example of the application of organizational and micro levels of analysis in examining revolutionary political behavior. Berman identifies three micro-structural processes that characterize institution-building in revolutionary organizations: mobilization, integration, and maintenance. Mobilization for Berman refers to its narrowest definition, that of recruitment. According to Berman, the central problem of recruitment is that of "overcoming the [potential members'] cognitive and motivational resistance to changing traditional ways" and of fostering a "generalized acceptance of authority" along new lines. Of primary significance to mobilization is the critical organizational role of ideology which in order to be effective must present a "coherent cognitive framework, a language, a set of symbols, and guidelines..." Accordingly, the study examines the

ideological content of the curriculum and textbooks in the Islamist revolutionary and traditionalist schools with respect to the above criteria.

Berman's additional concepts of integration and maintenance comprise the processes underlying Tilly's notion of "acquisition of collective control." Integration refers to the secondary step of institutionalizing the behavior patterns of new recruits. It is basd on the compliance of members to the formal command structure, and the structural linkages between members and leaders on formal and informal levels, maintenance refers to the stability of membership over time and in the face of harsh conditions. Accordingly, the study focuses on the organizational characteristics of the parties and their schools to compare integration and maintenance processes in the traditionalist and revolutionary Islamist models. The questionnire survey tests and compares the effectiveness of these political socialization and mobilization strategies.

. Schools and Mobilization Processes:

1- Recruitment: Findings showed that the traditionalist parties often thought of as "secular" in the West, engage students in just as much, if not more, religious instruction than do the Islamist revolutionaries. In fact, one of the three traditionalist parties, the Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement), which is made up mostly of members of the clergy has few secular schools and engages mostly in the training of a new generation of mullahs. On

the other hand it is one of the three Islamist revolutionary parties, the Ittihad-i Islami Baray Azadiyi Afghanistan (Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan), which has established the first and only institution of higher learning for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

The Islamist revolutionaries are indeed more conscious of the value of education in raising the political awareness of students, and in political indoctrination. They openly speak of using schools to instill an Islamic political ideology in the minds of the Afghan youth, and to counter the ideological indoctrination that many Afghan students have received in communist controlled schools inside Afghanistan. While, on the ideological level, both the traditionalists and the Islamist revolutionaries often mention the interrelatedness of the concepts "Muhajir" (refugee) and "Mujahid" (soldier of Holy War) as central to the historical origins of Islam, the Islamist revolutionaries simultaneously draw a sharp distinction between the two concepts and emphasize that not every "Muhajir" can become a "Mujahid" automatically. Rather, they emphasize that a process of transformation is needed. This process, they believe, relies heavily on systematic education in Islamic political ideology. Thus while their immediate goal is to train a dedicated cadre of fighters to be sent to the Jihad, their political ideology simultaneously emphasizes the necessity of developing the social, moral, and cognitive character of individual

"Political Mobilization Through Education: The Case of Afghan Refugee Youth in Pakistan"

Abstract

This study focuses on the role of schools as key political socialization and mobilization institutiopns in a context marked by refuge and revolution. The case concerns Afghan refugee youth in Pakistan [#?]. For this group the main chance for secondary education is provided by the Afghan political parties based in Pakistan which are engaged in a war of resistance to the Communist regime in Afghanistan supported by Russian troops. Two basic ideologico-organizational party types have been identified: "traditionalist" and "Islamist revolutionary." The study examines similarities and differences in political mobilization for the Jihad (Holy War) in 3 high schools, one from each party type and one independent non-party school. Analysis will be based, in part, on survey questionnaire data conducted among a sample of 248 students in grades 9 to 12, but also interviews with educators and analysis of textbooks. The study aims to provide a typological distinction of "traditionalist" and "revolutionary" mobilization goals and strategies through education. The effects of "differential socialization" on political extremism, here through education, will be compared to other factors associated with "mass society" theory, such as the displacement and disintegration of family and communal bonds, here due to war and flight to refuge. Thus, the

"Mujahids" along Islamic principles. In other words, In addition to being a soldier, a "Mujahid" is expected to be a complete Muslim, and act as such within his community, and to know and understand those political aspects of Islam, such as leadership selection, relevant to current as well as future community and organizational matters.

It is also important to make a quick distinction between radical and moderate Islamism. At the core of this distinction lies the concept of "Takfir", i.e. the act of declaring a Muslim a heretic. That is for a radical Islamist, such as a member of the Hizb-i Islami (Islamic Party) [Hekmatyar faction], a Muslim's identity is defined not by his religious attitudes but by his political conduct, and thus one whose political conduct does not conform to the "standards" as defined by Hizb (H) can be treated as a Kafir (non-believer) (Roy, 1986). This is an underlying issue that divides the two most powerful parties Hizb-i Islami (H) and Jamiat-i Islami (Islamic Society), the moderate Islamist revolutionary party). Despite many armed clashes both groups realize that for now and in the face of the Soviets, unity is more benefitial to both than to fanning the flames of ideological conflict. One indication of this is that one is not likely to encounter official pronouncements of such distinctions in educational settings until very advanced levels, and probably only where the question of integration into positions of responsiblity in the party has become evident, such as in special ideological course (Kors-hai

Aghidati), here in the case of Jamiat-i Islami, for those "Mujahids" who were going on to become leaders of small groups.

As far as the regular schools are concerned, just glancing through some of the textbooks produced by the different coalitions representing the Islamists and the traditionalists some of the difference in ideological approach between the two camps becomes apparent. Firstly it is important that the traditionalists adapted old textbooks used during the Monarchy or Daoud's period. Sometimes they just use these texts without any adaptations. The Islamists, however, have produced a whole new set of textbooks and have devised a new curriculum which represents a mixture of the previous secular system and religious Madrassahs.

Looking at the content of one Traditionalist textbook, the 4th grade reader in Dari, we find no references to Islam, Jihad, or Mujahideen. And the only story on Afghanistan has no references to Islam either. Instead there are the typical subjects on altruism, cleansiness, and a day at the park. [It is also interesting that no direct references can be found in traditionalist textbooks to the monarchy, for reasons stated above.] The Islamist Dari reader for the 2nd grade, however, has five full stories devoted to the Jihad and the Mujahideen (ranging from the meaning of Jihad to the moral behavior expected of a mujahid) with other such references in other stories throughout the text, 2 full stories on Afghanistan,

depicting it first and foremost as a country with an Islamic identity, and of course many more stories on Islam. [Another theme recieving much attention in the Islamist textbooks is that of Hijrat (migration).]

Thus, the political ideology of the Islamist revolutionaries is geared towards those requirements identified by Berman as central to an effective recruitment strategy as it provides both behavioral and cognitive guidelines for individual and social action along new lines, which nevertheless have a basis in traditional tenets of Islam. In contrast the traditionalist parties show less concern for the development or strengthening of their political ideology among the Afghan youth through education. Although they too place great emphasis on Islam and the importance of Jihad, their apolitical interpretation of Islam is devoid of an inherent political ideology to be emulated. Instead, the political models legitimized by the traditionalists are derived either from the tribal ethos and the monarchical system which represents it, or from exogenous "Western" models that found expression in the short-lived republican period. However, both of these models have received strong attacks from the Islamist revolutionaries as accommodating the communists and leading to the Soviet occupation.

2- Integration: The conceptual distinction inherent in the idea of "Takfir" is paralleled on the organizational level by the distiction between the concepts "Tanzim"

(organization) and "Hizb" (party) (see also Roy, 1985). The former is a general term in common use- by refugees and party members- for reference to all the parties regardless of their ideology. However, the label "Hizb" is adopted only by the most militant Islamist revolutionary parties. While the term "Tanzim" is somewhat vague and only implies an organized gathering, the "Hizb" label goes beyond this and connotes a sense of unified purpose, a more rigorous organizational command structure, a more rigid practice of organizational discipline, and a clearer regard for the relation of goals and means, characteristics which are often associated with "modern" political parties.

Given such attention to organization-building it is not surprising that the Islamist revolutionaries have developed special courses for members and sympathizers on different horizontal and vertical levels in their parties (i.e. upper level leaders, lower level party organizers, full-time and part-time Mujahids, orphaned youth, youth living away from families, and youth living with families, sympathizers, etc.). Each of these programs places varying levels of emphasis on 'Islamic political ideology', 'military training', and 'secular science' in its curriculum. For example in the educational domain in Jamiat we see outside the formal education system which includes both secular and religious schools, and special schools for orphans (where religious subjects predominate), many different programs such as special medical training, a journalism school,

language courses in Arabic and English, ideological courses for Mujahids who are on leave from the war, and other such programs. Such diversity is of course absent in the Traditionalist system, (because of lack of qualified personnel, lack of resources, but also probably a lack vision). This emphasis on specialized training fits in with Berman's integration requirements, as specialization enhances integration by leading to the institutionalization of new behavior patterns along existing structured organizational roles. Moreover, specialization matches the potential capabilities of target populations with what is expected of them in the organization.

[Add more from Article file:

Something about traditionalists' education being non-differentiated]

3- Maintenance: Another important educational issue related to both integration and maintenance is the question of meritocracy in the selection and legitimization of leaders, and in organizational mobility. While in both Hizb-i Islami (H) and Jamiat-i Islami the legitimacy of leaders is derived from their length of active political opposition and from ideological commitments, in the traditionalist parties we see legitimacy based mainly on reputation of family religious descent [in the case of Gaylani of Mahaz, a seyyed, and Mojaddedi of Jibhi], and on reputation as a respected Islamic scholar within the network of the Molavi [in the case of Nabi Mohammadi of Harakat]. As

a result in the traditionalist system decision making rests wholely with the party leader, where there is no internal recourse and no way to dispute decisions coming from above. In a system like this upward mobility rests solely on patronage.

The Islamist revolutionaries, however, claim that their educational systems allow for meritocracy in leadership selection and in the upward mobility of recruits. This, they assert, corresponds to the strong emphasis on personal achievement rather than patronage in their overall organizational ideology. However, despite the Islamist revolutionaries' claim regarding the importance of meritocracy, findings show that they as well as the traditionalists use party affiliation rather than pedagogical competence as the main criterion for teacher selection. In fact, many voluntary agencies claim that a surprising number of primary level teachers in both groups are unable to read or write. Yet, the two groups differ in one important respect. For the Islamist revolutionaries ideological commitment and competence are relatively more important considerations of acceptance into party ranks and thus in teacher selection as well. The traditionalists, however, rely on a more simplified form of patronage that is based solely on tribal codes and relationships, rather than on ideological commitment (in exchange for remunerative rewards, i.e. through employment- a scarce resource in the refugee context- here as teachers).

It is too early to tell whether the same differences will hold true for the selection of future graduates for party positions and of their mobility in organizational hierarchies. However, it could be said that the greater ideological (normative) appeal, and the stronger discipline (coercive) that is found among the Islamist revolutionary parties, is advantageous to the future growth of these parties as politically representative and thus heterogeneous organizations, as both these factors cut ascross traditional ethnic and tribal segmentations. The traditionalists, however, rely mostly on the authority and patronage (remunerative) of tribal leaders. While patronage may prove effective in attracting a large number of supporters in the short term, it may not prove reliable in maintaining that support base in the long run. In fact, one often encounters teachers in traditionalist schools who privately admit to their sympathies for the Islamist revolutionaries, but have stayed on because of financial needs, however, the reverse is seldom, if ever, true of teachers in the Islamist revolutionary schools.

Methodology

Interviews: Research conducted in the 11 months of fieldwork has been based in part on in-depth interviews with officials from exiled Afghan parties, government of Pakistan, voluntary agencies, as well as other informed persons. More than 100 such interviews have been conducted. Selection of interviewees was based on their roles as

organizational leaders and decision makers, knowledge of organizational ideology, involvement in educational planning, and roles as teachers and administrators.

[Range of the contents of interviews?]

Interviews with Afghans were conducted in Persian, and those with Pakistanis and Westerners in English. Most interviews were conducted in Peshawar or nearby areas, and in Islamabad, at the offices of the various organizations involved, at school sites, or after the establishment of informal relations at the residences of interviewees or the researcher. Additional interviews have been conducted with officials of the Department of State in Washington D.C., and of the United Nations High Commisssioner for Refugees in Geneva.

Textbooks: Many textbooks that are utilized in traditionalist and Islamist revolutionary schools have been collected and will be analyzed for their ideological content as an indicator of political socialization standards adhered to by the parties.

Questionnaire Data: This, central segment of the study focuses on the students' political attitudes and behavior. It measures the effectiveness of the political socialization (beliefs) and mobilization (behavior) strategies at each school. It provides the basis for: 1- comparing the effects of traditionalist and Islamist revolutionary education, and ; 2- testing the "Differential Socialization" hypothesis against "Disorientation" models as causes of political

extremism (here identified as participation in Islamist revolutionary parties).

Selection of Schools and Parties: Parties from which schools were selected for the questionnaire surveys were chosen based on: 1- Affiliation with traditionalist or Islamist revolutionary alliances, and; 2- The degree of trust established and extensiveness of contacts developed by the researcher with the officials of the parties. Hizb-i Islami, (H), the most militant of all the Islamist revolutionary parties, was selected and subsequently granted permission for the questionnaire survey after many rounds of negotiations extending over months. From the traditionalist camp Jibha-i Milli Nijat (National Liberation Front) was approached first but declined permission. Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami, however, did grant permission through informal channels.

[Additionally voluntary agency school selected as control]

In each case the school selected was the highschool the party officials and other independent educators considered to be the best one in that organization, in terms of quality of instruction. The independent highschool run by a voluntary agency was also the best of its kind available to Afghan refugees in Peshawar. The other two schools were also located in Peshawar. This meant that the parties, (and the voluntary agency), were able to maximize their control of the schools since they are all headquartered in Peshawar. As

such these schools may reflect their party's control more than those outside peshawar and thus the effects of differnet party types on educational programs are expected to be more pronounced here.

Sample: The sample includes 248 students in 9-12th grades in three schools. Given limitations on resources, only in the Islamist revolutionary school were any 9th graders included. (The independent school lacked a 9th grade). However, this sub-sample allows for widening the range of comparison within the Islamist revolutionary school which forms the basis of focus on extremist political behavior.

In each school classes were selected at random where all students were asked to respond to the survey which took about 150 minutes to complete. Anonymity was ensured in all cases. Only one student- in the taditionalist school- refused to respond, citing privacy reasons.

Since all schools were located in the city of Peshawar the effects of selection on variations in student background characteristics is expected to be constant across all three schools.

Measurement: In the survey questionnaire political mobilization is measured along the three indices identified earlier: recruitment, integration, and maintenance. Recruitment is measured by: A) Active membership (Question 36d), and; B) Potential for joining a party, based on: 1- Self identity (Q 30); 2- The degree to which the

comparative dimension of data offers a chance for theory building and testing regarding the determinants of socio-political change in refugee communities and their role in social movements. In addition, the study offers primary data that could form the basis of generalization from the Afghan "Islamist" movement to other "militant Islamic" movements in the Muslim world.

respondant's political beliefs and religious attitudes correspond to those associated with Islamist revolutionary or traditionalist ideology (Q 27, 32, 36a-c, 41[IV], 43, 44, & 45), and; 3- Practice of Islamic rites (Q 28, & 29).

Integration is tapped by a variety of questions regarding: A) Channels used for information (Q 24, & 25); B) Participation in the Jihad (Q 38); C) Participation in party programs (Q 40); D) Reasons for joining the party (Q 37); E) Organizational mobility (Q 36d); F) Preferred agents of socialization (Q 35), and; G) Strength of parental authority (Q 33, & 34).

Maintenance is measured by: A) Changes in Party affiliation(Q 24e): B) Duration of membership (Q 36d); C) Existance of friends in the party (Q 24d), and; D) Preferred authority figure (Q 31).

A host of questions deal with the respondent's background characteristics, such as ethnicity, region of origin, and the socio-economic status (education, employment, and income) of the father (Q 3, & 7-11). Family-party relations are also dealt with to control for family choice in party affiliation and school selection.

Those aspects of war, such as death and injuries, most likely to negatively affect communal solidarity and family cohesion, and to cause psychological disorientation are examined in detail (Q 15). Other questions deal specifically with migration history (Q 3-6)- some of which tap separation from the family- before and after the war.

Future Research and Write-up Plans:

Field research was supported by a grant from the Fulbright-Hays foundations for a period of 11 months. This proposal is in request for an additional three months of fieldwork in Pakistan, plus six months for secondary research as well as rewriting. If granted, this opportunity will enable me to enlarge the size of the sample of students in the survey and cover gaps in existing data sets that may be expected due to the small size of the present sample. It will also enable me to update findings, and to prepare my dissertation for publication. Your favorable consideration of this proposal will be most gratefully appreciated.

Introduction

Recent scholarship on refugees in the third world has documented an increase in the number of refugee communities that are marked by their violent political behavior. These refugees have been variously labelled as "guerrillas", "rebels", "freedom fighters," and more recently as "warriors" (cf. Marcum, 1972; Zolberg, et, al., 1986). Yet, the processes leading to the transformation of these communities into those marked by political violence have been little studied. According to Zolberg, et, al. (1986:158-61) the conditions that govern the transformation of refugee communities towards an increased adoption of political violence are identical to those that underlie the processes of revolutionary social change. This study examines the role of refugee educational institutions in the process of political mobilization within an ongoing revolutionary setting. It thus relies on primary sources of data.

The case of secondary schools controlled by the exiled Afghan political parties in Pakistan provides an excellent opportunity for the study of political mobilization for war in a refugee community. None of these parties is currently in control of state power. Yet, all are engaged in mobilizing Afghan refugees in Pakistan to counter the Soviet occupation and to overthrow the communist regime in Afghanistan. Two basic camps have been recognized among these parties based on political ideology, organizational

structure, leadership, and sources of support (Shahrani, 1984). These camps have at times been formalized in the form of more or less stable alliances. They include the three "traditionalist" parties that favor a return to the status-quo of the monarchy or of the short-lived republican period that followed it, and the four "Islamist revolutionary" parties that favor the replacement of the Communist regime with an Islamic state. This typological distinction allows for the comparison of revolutionary and non-revolutionary educational mobilization programs among the same target population- i.e., the Afghan refugee students in Pakistan.

The Afghan Islamist revolutionary groups fit in the general category of "militant Islamic" movements that have appeared in many other countries of the Middle East. They are referred to as revolutionary because they envision a new social order and represent a new conception of the state in Afghan society. They conceive of the state as a system of governance that must draw on Islamic principles as the source of its legitimacy, and which must actively intervene in all aspects of social life in order to bring Afghan society closer to the envisioned social order. Accordingly, for the Islamist revolutionaries it is the politico-ideological character of Islam that defines its role in society, whereas for the traditionalists the societal role of Islam is limited to its doctrinal and

theological aspects in a context defined by the general separation of church and state.

[Say something about "modern" (Roy) organizational forms in Islamist camp, and tribal-organizational limitations in the traditionlaist]

Organizational History: The Islamist revolutionary groups have their origins in the 1960s as the Muslim Youth student organization at Kabul University. They arose in direct opposotion to the then dominant Marxist student groups, to take away control of campus political activity from the latter by the early 1970s (Rahman and Qureshi, 1981). In fact, the political careers of many Communist party leaders may be said to start with the Kabul University's Marxist student groups as well, and thus the current conflict between the Islamists and the Communists can be traced to their, often violent, confrontations at the University. Roy (1985) contends that most Islamist revolutionaries had originally received some religious education before attending the university, whereas the Marxists had in general attended only secular primary and secondary schools. In addition, Roy asserts that while the Islamist revolutionaries had received their religious training in state-sponsered religious schools, the traditionalists were trained mostly in traditional non-formal religious schools (i.e. based on private instruction by mullahs) and thus were blocked from entrance to universities. While no primary set of data are yet

available regarding the sociological characteristics of Afghan Islamic militants, Shahrani (1984:47-8) describes the Islamist revolutionaries as "educated Islamic-minded youth" from "rural and urban" origins and "middle- lower-middle class backgrounds." Additionally, Roy (1985:6, 10-11) contends that the core of the Islamic militant groups are made up of "intellectuals" drawn from the "state burgeosie," mainly the government academic system. He brakes down the main recruitment networks into: a) the schools of science; b) government madrassahs, and; c) the teacher training schools. Moreover, the Marxist students are thought to be from lower-middle (Khalq faction) as well as upper-middle (Parcham faction) classes but of mainly urban origins. In contrast, the traditionalists may be similar to the Islamist revolutionaries in their rural and small-town backgrounds with the exception of lack of a modern and university education (which also presupposes migration to Kabul).

Accordingly, we may expect that the Islamist revolutionaries, given their backgrounds as politically active university students, would be more attentive to the role of ideology in education, and to the potential political mobilization functions of schools than would the traditionalists.

Significance of the Study

Education and Moblilization:

From 1950s up to the early 1970s, the dominant theories of the sociology of education conceived of education as a

reproductive mechanism for meeting the functional requirements of system maintenance, or of societal adaptation to environmental challenges (Karabel and Halsey, 1977). By the mid 1970s many educational studies focused on societies that had experienced revolutionary changes. Consequently the role of educational institutions in building a new social order received greater attention (Paulston, 1977). However, these studies have focused on the post-revolutionary periods alone and the theoretical conceptions deriving from them failed to illuminate the role of education in those change processes that characterize the immediate pre-revolutionary period. Thus there exists a gap in the available sociological theories of education which results in serious methodological problems. For example, many attempts at theory building have been based on comparisons of state-sponsered educational systems in pre- and post-revolutionary periods (e.g. Wallace, 1979).

This temporal jump over a period when the state faces decline and non-state forces are on the rise, results in a failure to consider the processes that underlie the heightening of conflict and transition of power. Thus instead of emphasis on those educational activities that fall outside the sphere of state control, one finds in these studies an added emphasis on the role of state sponsered educational programs. Consequently, similar to traditional theories of education, here too it is those functions of

educational systems, such as system maintenance, that receive primary attention.

Despite available historical ecidence on the use of education by many revolutionary organizations, the role of education in the emergence of revolutionary forces as powerful and legitimate contenders for state power remains unexplored (see Hawkins, 1974, as an exception). In the available body of literature, a new conception of educational institutions as change agents in the revolutionary process is quite recent and may be traced to Freire's practical literacy campaigns in Brazil in the 1960s, and his important philosophical treatise (1971). In these, Freire proposed and practiced a literacy method that was geared towards radical social change. However, theoretical conceptualizations that offer specific hypotheses regarding the relation of educational variables to factors characterizing revolutionary processes are quite rare (LaBelle, 1986). Thus, a case study that focuses on the role of non-state (or rather anti-state) educational efforts, in the period preceding the fall of the old regime and the establishment of the new political order can contribute substantially to bridge existing theoretical gaps. By focusing on processes unique to this revolutionary period, such as rapid changes in the traditional patterns of social interaction, and the redefinition of the political order a new conception of the role of education emerges, i.e. as a political mobilization tool.

B) <u>Political Extremism and Differential Socialization Through Education</u>:

Debates on the determinants of revolutions have been multi-faceted. One area in which the study of refugee communities can be especially enlightening concerns the question of 'who joins revolutionary movements and why?' Some have viewed revolutionaries as uprooted individuals who have become unsettled and anomic. Others view them as highly capable and socially conscious individuals who are well integrted into their societies. Refugees, such as Afghans in Pakistan, most of whom have faced enormous personal and material losses due to war and genocide, and all of whom have become uprooted due to their flight to Pakistan represent an appropriate population for testing the uprootedness hypothesis since many of them are also engaged in an active resistance movement (both revolutionary and non-revolutionary).

Since the advent of the "mass society" school, political extremism has often been viewed as rooted in the disintegration of communal bonds and in the "marginality" of certain groups from mainstream social life. These in turn have been linked to factors and conditions associated with rapid "modernization," such as mass ~~rural~~ to urban migration and the brakedown of traditional norms in modern urban environments (Kornhauser, 1960; Fromm, 1963; Lipset, 1963). Findings from empirical research on "leftist radicalism," especially in Latin America, have been unable to confirm